Omegamon Reflex Automation Security not alined with z/OS Security requirements

The existing Security Management implemented for Reflex Automation was not aligned with basic z/OS security concept.
Today if a customer enable the function to propagate the TEP end user that is executing a TEP "TAKE ACTION" on a z/OS Omegamon Agent, this will force the infrastructure to associate a userid also for the Reflex automation actions.

The reflex Automation capability available within a situation was and is always considered an automation capability provided by our Omegamon suite, an automated action executed when a specific situation is detected should always be executed to prevent problems or critical situations.

Enabling the userid propagation for the TEP TAKE ACTION, will force the infrastructure to use as userid that require a specific Reflex automation action the userid of the TEP User that updated the last time the related situation.
This userid can be an userid of a person that:
- just has the userid revoked for many reason
- is not authorized to execute a z/OS command
- changed role recently and is not yet authorized to execute z/OS command
- left the company and for this reason his or her userid was removed from RACF
This behavior will make reflex automation unusable or at high risk. Something that is working today cannot work tomorrow for multiple different reasons.