zCEE to have an option for a SAF call to check if the authenticated user was authorised to invoke a service

Whilst this requirement is valid, based on our current plans and priorities for IBM z/OS Connect Enterprise Edition, it is not likely that this could be implemented in the next 12 months. Correspondingly this requirement is being declined at this point. The requirement will be kept in the RFE system and might be reassessed in the future. You also have an opportunity to resubmit in twelve months time if you wish it to be reconsidered then.

Additional comments from the client:

Description:
The product z/OS Connect Enterprise Edition (zCEE) currently has the means to perform System Authorisation Facility (SAF) calls to perform access authorisation checks … and it does against resources in the APPL class and its own EJBROLE class. These current checks simply verify that the user can use zCEE.

However, the more granular controls that dictate which services a user can use in zCEE (administrative, operational, invoke or no authority to services) are managed via the product's “Authorisation Interceptor” feature which does not use SAF authorisation calls but rather checks the configuration of the user's security profile (it checks the user's membership in specific groups).

This RFE is requesting that the product be enhanced to perform the preferred SAF calls to determine which services in zCEE a user can use.


Private Business justification:

Checking a user profile configuration is not a proper security check.


This is like saying :
“if the name field associated with the user id starts with ‘BRUCE' allow the user full administrative authority”.

The problems with this style of control are numerous, including:

· There is no accountability - there is no way to know that these checks/decisions are being made and who is using the services – i.e. no SMF logging is possible.
With a SAF call, all resources (or users of those resources) can have various levels of auditing turned on so usage and accountability can be determined

· There is no flexibility - security administrators are confined to using just one group per service …. And this can't be changed to another group without a major change to the product configuration.
With a SAF call, access to a resource is checked which has an associated access list that can provide access directly to users and/or to one or more groups.

· Risk of disruption - security administrators could very easily remove or delete the groups as there is no apparent purpose for them (they provide no access and there is no trail of them being used). Groups are meant to be purely internal security constructs to allow administrators to associate users with collections of access or to establish ownership hierarchies … using them as zCEE is doing is entirely inappropriate.

· Compromises Reporting - this approach compromises our access reporting in that there are “invisible” accesses enjoyed by anyone connected to these groups … none of our reporting (nor any commercial security tools like zSecure/Vanguard) attributes any entitlements based purely on the membership of a group but rather the resources where groups or user ids appear on access lists.